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Abstract
The method of Single Transferable Voting (STV) underpins elections
in several countries. The advantages claimed for STV are that, firstly, it
allows each voter to express his/her preferences over all the candidates
and, secondly, it takes account of each voter’s range of preferences in de-
terming the electoral outcome. A disquieting feature of STV - and one
that has hardly been commented upon - is that the second point is not
true: some voters have more than just their first preference taken account
of; for other voters, it is only their first preference votes which are counted,
their remaining preferences being ignored. This creates two classes of vot-
ers - termed in this paper as ‘further-preference’ and ‘first-preference only’
voters. Applying these concepts to the (STV based) Northern Ireland As-
sembly elections of 2003, this paper shows that over half of all voters were
‘first-preference only’ voters. Moreover, the diﬀerent parties had diﬀer-
ent endowments of voters from these groups: in particular, the Unionist
parties had a disproprtionately larger share of ‘further-preference’ voters
compared to the Nationalist parties. This might go some way to explain-
ing why, even though the vote share of the Democratic Unionist Party was
only slightly higher - and the vote share of the Ulster Unionist Party was
actually lower - than that of Sinn Féin, both parties had disproportion-
ately more seats in the Assembly. The paper proceeds to argue that, if
society is averse to inter-voter inequality, it might prefer a voting method
which treated all voters equally - even though it allowed them a more
limited expression of preferences over candidates - to the STV method.
∗I am grateful to John Fitzgerald and George Tridimas for comments though, needless to
say, I am solely responsible for any errors.
†School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Co. Antrim, Northern Ireland
BT37 0QB. (e-mail: V.K.Borooah@ulst.ac.uk)
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1 Introduction
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a method of voting that allows voters to
rank candidates (as opposed to parties) in order of preference. Under STV, each
voter is allowed to write a number against the name of each candidate listed
on the ballot paper, where this number expresses the voter’s preference for the
candidate: the most preferred candidate has a ‘1’ against his/her name, the
next most preferred a ‘2’, and so on. The first stage of the count is to ascertain
the total number of first preference votes for each candidate. Any candidate
who has more first preference votes than the ‘quota’1 is immediately elected.
If no candidate achieves the quota, the candidates with the lowest number of
votes is eliminated and the second preferences on his/her ballot papers are
assigned to the remaining candidates. If a candidate is elected at a particular
count, the surplus votes (i.e. votes in excess of the quota) are redistributed,
according to the subsequent (or ‘next available’) preferences on the ballot papers,
to the remaining candidates2. National parliamentary elections in Ireland - and
elections to the Assembly and to local District Councils in Northern Ireland - are
underpinned by STV. It is also used in Malta and for elections to the Tasmanian
- and the Australian Capital Territory - Legislative Assembly.
The rationale for the STV method is two-fold. First, each ballot paper is
capable of expressing the preference ordering of voters over all the candidates
though, needless to say, voters - by truncating the ordering - may express pref-
erences over only a subset of the available candidates. Second, the preference
rankings of the voters are taken into account in determining the successful can-
didates. This occurs because when a candidate is elected at a count - or when
a candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated, in the event of no
election at a count - votes are transferred to the candidates next in the order of
preference on the successful (or eliminated) candidate’s ballot papers3.
However, an anomaly of the method is that when a candidate (or candidates)
are elected at the first count, the transfer of votes to the remaining candidates
is eﬀected by examining the second preferences of all the ballot papers of the
elected candidate(s). However, for candidates elected at subsequent counts,
only the transfers made at the count of election are examined for subsequent
preferences. This rule for eﬀecting transfers creates two classes of voters. Some
voters - ‘further-preference’ voters - after declaring their preferences across the
candidates, have a range of their preferences taken account of in determining the
successful candidates. For other voters (‘first-preference only’ voters), it is only
their first preference votes which influence the election outcomes, their remaining
preferences being ignored. This is what is meant by the ‘unequal treatment of
voters’ under STV. How this discriminatory treatment comes about - and the
1This quota is also known as the “Droop” quota and is the analogue of a simple majority
in a single member constituency. A quota is not the same as a “threshold” since, on the last
count, a candidate may be elected without reaching the quota: it is, therefore, a suficient, but
not a necessary, condition for election.
2For a fuller discussion of STV, including its merits and demerits, see Hallett (1984), Katz
(1984), Amy (1993) and Bowles and Grofman (2000).
3For elected canidates it is the votes in excess of the quota that are transferred.
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voters who comprise the ‘further-preference’ and ‘first-preference only’ groups
- is discussed in the next section. Suﬃce it to say here, the value of the STV
method is diminished by the fact that all voters are not treated equally. As a
corollary of this, there may be a case for supporting alternative election methods
which, while allowing voters only a limited expression of their preferences across
candidates, ensures that all votes count equally towards the electoral outcome.
In other words, it can be argued that, if electoral welfare depends on both the
full expression of preferences by voters and on the equal treatment of all voters,
there may well be a trade-oﬀ between ‘full expression’ and ‘equal treatment’.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of such a trade-oﬀ and to
apply it to results from the (STV-based) elections of November 2003 to the
Northern Ireland Assembly.
2 The Analytical Framework
There are N voters in a constituency from which, without loss of generality, six
members are to be elected4 using the method of STV. The (“Droop”) quota
is, therefore, Q = (N/7) + 1: any candidate receiving Q or more votes, at any
count, is deemed to be elected. If C represents the set of candidates, let V rX
represent the number of votes counted for X ∈ C at the rth count, where V 1X -
the number of votes counted for X at the first count - represents the number of
first-preference votes received by the candidate.
2.1 Case 1: a candidate(s) is elected at the first count
Suppose that X, at the first count, receives votes equal to, or in excess of, the
quota (V 1X ≥ Q) and is, therefore, elected. The ‘surplus’ of X , denoted SX , is
the excess of votes received over the quota: SX = V 1X −Q ≥ 0. This surplus is
then to be distributed over the remaining candidates.
Let V 1Xj (> 0) represent the number of voters - of the V
1
X voters who had X
as their most preferred candidate - who ranked j (j ∈ C, j 6= X) as their second-
preference candidate and let V 1X0 ≥ 0 be the number of X’s non-transferable
votes (that is, votes received byX in which no further preference was expressed).
By definition:
V 1X =
X
j 6=X
V 1Xj + V
1
X0 (1)
Now define the proportions5:
π1Xj = V 1Xj/V 1X (2)
4Six members are elected from each of the 18 constituencies to the Northern Ireland As-
sembly.
5By equation (1),
P
j 6=X π
1
Xj ≤ 1,
P
j 6=X π
1
Xj = 1 ⇔ V
1
X0 = 0This method of defining
proportions where non-transfers are taken into account is used in Northern Ireland. In the
Republic of Ireland, non-transfers are set aside and the proportions are defined as: π1Xj =
V 1Xj/(V
1
X − V
1
X0).
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Then, at the second count, candidate j (j /∈ X) receives the proportion π1Xj
of X’s surplus of SX votes. Consequently, the transfers to candidate j (denoted
T 2Xj), made at the second count, from the surplus votes of X are computed as
6:
T 2Xj = π1XjSX (3)
If, at the first count, another candidate, Y, was also elected, each of the re-
maining candidates j would receive transfers from Y - computed analogously
to transfers from X - as T 2Y j = π1Y jSY . Consequently, at the end of the second
count, the votes counted for candidate j are:
V 2j = V
1
j + T
2
j (4)
where T 2j represents the total of transfers received by j from all the candidates
who were elected at the first count.
In the Republic of Ireland, the T 2Xj and T
2
Y j ballot papers, representing the
transferred votes to j from, respectively, X and Y , are drawn randomly from
the total of V 1Xj and V
1
Y j ballot papers in which voters, after giving their first
preference to X and Y, respectively, gave j their second preference. In Northern
Ireland, all the V 1Xj and V
1
Y j second-preference ballot papers are transferred
to candidate j at the appropriate fractions of their value7. This diﬀerence in
procedure between the two parts of Ireland has no implications for the votes
received by any of the candidates at this count, but it does have implications for
subsequent counts when later preferences may have to be counted. This is be-
cause while all the V 1Xj and V
1
Y j ballot papers have the same second-preference
(namely, candidate j), they will quite likely diﬀer in terms of subsequent pref-
erences.
2.2 Case 2: a candidate(s) is elected at the second or later
count
Suppose that a candidate, X, after receiving transfers from earlier counts, is
elected at the Rth(> 1) count. These transfers may come either from candidates
elected or eliminated at previous counts.
If no candidate was elected at the previous count (R−1) ≥ 1 - because none
achieved the quota Q - then the candidate with the lowest number of votes
is eliminated and all of his/her votes are distributed to the other candidates.
Since the candidate was eliminated at count R − 1, it is the Rth preference on
that candidate’s ballot that is the relevant (‘next available’) preference.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that Y received the lowest number of
votes at the (R − 1)th count, in which no candidate was elected. Then Y is
6Note that, because of the presence of non-transferable votes, the entire surplus of X may
not be distributed among the remaining candidates. However, it will be in the Republic of
Ireland where non-transfers are set aside.
7These fractions are T 2Xj/V
1
Xj = π
1
XjSX/V
1
Xj = SX/V
1
X and T
2
Y j/V
1
Y j = π
1
Y jSY /V
1
Y j =
SY /V
1
Y
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eliminated at that count and the votes counted for the remaining candidates -
of which X is one - at the subsequent - Rth - count are:
V RX = V
R−1
X + T
R
YX (5)
where TRYX are the transfers received by X at the R
th count from Y, the candi-
date eliminated in the previous count8.
On the other hand, the transfers to X could have come from the surplus
votes of a candidate (or candidates) elected at the previous (R − 1)th count.
Irrespective of how these transfers arrive, since V RX > Q, X is elected at the
Rth(> 1) count and X 0s surplus votes, (SX = V RX −Q), are then tranferred to
the remaining candidates.
Now the votes counted for X at the Rth count are the sum of the X’s votes at
the first count (V 1X) and the transfer votes received by X at subsequent counts
(T rX , r = 2...R):
V RX = V
1
X +
RX
r=2
T rX (6)
Then X’s surplus is distributed among the remaining candidates by calcu-
lating, for each of the remaining candidates j, the proportion of the transfer
votes that X received at the count at which he/she was elected - which, in this
case is the Rth count - which had candidate j as their ‘next available preference’
(i.e. (R+ 1)th) preference. Let σRXj denote this proportion.
At the end of the (R+1)th count, each candidate j receives a total of TR+1Xj
transfer votes from the surplus votes of X where:
TR+1Xj = σ
R
XjSX (7)
If, at theRth count, another candidate, Y, was also elected, each of the remaining
candidates j would receive transfers from Y - computed analogously to transfers
from X - as TR+1Y j = σRY jSY . Consequently, at the end of the (R + 1)th count,
the votes counted for candidate j are:
V R+1j = V
R
j + T
R+1
j (8)
where TR+1j represents the total of all transfers received by j at the (R + 1)
th
count.
3 The relative importance of diﬀerent voters
Lying at the source of these surplus transfers, described above, is/are the candi-
date(s) elected at the first count (i.e. those whose first-preference votes exceeded
8 It is possible, in order to speed the counting, to eliminate more than one candidate at
the same count. For example, suppose for three candidates, A, B, and C : V RA < V
R
B < V
R
C ,
V RC − V
R
B > V
R
A > and V
R
C + V
R
A < Q. Then even if all of A’s votes went to B, B would
still have the lowest number of votes, after candidate A was eliminated; and even if all of A’s
votes went to candidate C, C would still not be elected at the next count. Consequently, B is
bound to be eliminated at the next count and could, as well, be dropped at the current count.
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the quota) for it is he/she/they who triggers the chain of surplus vote transfers.
If X was elected at the first count, then all the votes received byX are inspected
in eﬀecting the transfer of his/her surplus at the second count to the remaining
candidates.
However, the distribution of the surplus votes of a candidate, Y - elected
at a later count - to the remaining candidates at the next count, are drawn
entirely from the transfer votes received by the elected candidates at the count at
which they were elected. Consequently, once Y has been elected, the subsequent
preferences of those voters for whom Y was the most prefered candidate play
no role in influencing subsequent results. In contrast, as long as candidates
are elected at successive counts, the subsequent preferences of those voters for
whom X - who was elected at the first count - was the most prefered candidate
play a role in influencing subsequent results.
In that sense, while all voters are treated equally in terms of first-preference
votes, it is the subsequent preferences of voters who plumped for a candidate(s)
who was elected at the first count that thread their way into later counts. The
subsequent preferences of voters whose most-preferred candidates were elimi-
nated also matter since these preferences show up as votes for the remaining
candidates9. But the subsequent preferences of those voters who gave their first-
preference vote to a candidate who was elected, but not at the first count - as
well as the subsequent preferences voters who gave their first-preference vote to
a candidate who was neither elected nor eliminated10 - are entirely disregarded.
This anomaly springs from the fact that vote transfers under STV are eﬀected
solely by reference to the votes received by elected candidates at the count at
which they were elected.
<Table 1>
Table 1 shows that in the November 2003 elections to the Northern Ireland
Assembly - conducted using STV - only 28 per cent of voters gave their first
preference votes to candidates who were elected at the first count, and only
18 per cent of voters gave their first preference votes to candidates who were
eliminated during the counts: such voters are termed ‘further-preference’ voters
because their preferences - beyond their first preference - influence the electoral
outcome. Conversely, 46 percent of voters gave their first preference votes to
candidates who were elected at later counts, and 8 per cent of voters gave their
first preference votes to candidates who were not eliminated during the counts.
Consequently, over half (54 per cent) of voters at the 2003 Northern Ireland
Assembly elections influenced the electoral outcome solely through their first
preference vote; their further preferences were ignored. Such voters are termed
‘first-preference only’ voters.
9The only way way the influence of the X voters is broken is if there is no election at a
count so that a candidate is eliminated. In that case, subsequent transfers are drawn from
the votes of the eliminated candidates.
10 i.e. a candidate who was still in the contest at the count at which the final candidate was
elected.
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Voters comprising the ‘further-preference’ group constituted two extreme
subgroups. At one extreme, there were those voters who supported (i.e. gave
their first preference votes to) strong candidates who were elected at the first
count: a little over 28 per cent of all voters at the 2003 Northern Ireland As-
sembly elections fell into this category. At the other extreme of the ‘further-
preference’ group were those who supported weak candidates who were elimi-
nated before the election was concluded: nearly 18 per cent of voters were in this
category. ‘First-preference only’ voters also comprised two subgroups. There
were those who supported candidates who were strong enough to be elected, but
who lacked the necesary support to be elected at the first count: nearly: 46 per
cent of all voters were in this category. There were also those who supported
candidates who did not have enough support to be elected, but who were not
weak enough to be eliminated before the election was concluded: such persons
comprised 8 per cent of all voters.
<Table 2>
Northern Ireland has four main parties. Of these, two - the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) - represent unionist
aspirations for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom and two
- Sinn Féin (SF) and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) - represent
nationalist aspirations for a united Ireland. In addition to these four big parties,
there are a range of smaller parties clubbed together in this study under the
rubric ‘Other parties’. With this background, one may examine the division into
‘further-preference’ and ‘first-preference only’ voters in terms of party support.
Table 2 shows that of the 177,944 voters who gave their first preference vote
to the DUP, 44 per cent (77,478 voters) cast their votes for DUP candidates
who were elected at the first count. Similarly, of the 156,931 voters who gave
their first preference vote to the UUP, 43 percent (66,741 voters) cast their votes
for UUP candidates who were elected at the first count. Consequently, nearly a
half of unionist voters were ‘further-preference’ voters whose further preferences
percolated through the subsequent counts, influencing their outcomes. By con-
trast, only 24 per cent of SF voters - and only 6 per cent of SDLP voters - were
in a position to influence electoral outcomes beyond the first count.
In the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, the DUP received 15,186
more first preference votes (representing 2 per cent of the total of 692,028 votes)
- while the UUP received 5,827 fewer votes - than SF. Yet, the DUP won six
more seats - and the UUP won three more seats - than SF. At least part of this
can be ascribed to the fact that the preferences of DUP and UUP supporters
were more eﬀective in making their way through the electoral system compared
to the preferences of SF supporters.
More generally, the fact that voters under STV are treated diﬀerently, in
terms of how their preferences influence electoral outcomes, may also explain
why a perceived weakness of the STV system is its lack of proportionality11 .
11 See The Electoral Reform Society, http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting sys-
tems/systems3.htm
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Indeed, using Gallaher’s (1991) “least squares” index for disproportionality12 ,
the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections returned a value of 3.1 for this
index13. This represented the same level of disporoportionality as Ireland and
a higher level of disproportionality than Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Den-
mark, Sweden, Italy and Iceland (Gallagher, 1991).
4 Welfare Implications of Inequality in Electoral
Influence
We suppose that every voter, i = 1...N, has a preference ranking over all the
candidates. Suppose the election extends over R counts. Let ki = 1..R repre-
sent the number of counts at which a preference from voter i’s ballot paper is
recorded: 1 ≤ ki ≤ R. Hereafter, ki is referred to as voter i’s electoral influ-
ence: the higher the value of ki, the greater the influence. At one extreme, if
ki = 1, it is only voter i’s first preference that matters; at the other extreme, if
ki = R, voter i’s preferences are taken into account in all the counts. For the
‘first-preference only’ group of voters (defined in the previous section), ki = 1
since, by construct of STV, every (first preference) vote is counted at the first
count. For ‘further preference’ voters, ki > 1.
We assume that the utility (U) a voter derives from participating in an STV-
based election depends postively on the number of counts at which a preference
from his ballot is recorded:
U = U(ki) (9)
where, by assumption: marginal utility is positive (U 0(ki) > 0) but diminishing
in ki (U 00(ki) < 0). If electoral welfare, W , is represented as the sum of the
utilities of the individual voters:
W =
NX
i=1
U(ki) (10)
then electoral welfare is maximised under an electoral system in which ki =
R,∀i.
Suppose that, because of the nature of the voting method used, electoral
welfare cannot be maximised. Assume that, in the most general case, the vector
k = {ki} represents the distribution of electoral influence across the i = 1...N
voters, where ki < R for some i. The average level of electoral influence under
the voting method is:
k =
NX
i=1
ki (11)
12Defined as: L =
£
1
2
¡PK
k=1
(vk − sk)2
¢¤ 1
2 , where vk and sk are the vote and seat shares
of party k.
13This was lower than the value of 4.2 for the 1998 Assembly elections.
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In the context of the distinction, under STV, between ‘further-preference’ and
‘first-preference only’ voters, ki > 1 for ‘further-preference’ voters and ki = 1
for ‘first-preference only’ voters. If α represents the proportion of ‘further-
preference’ voters, and µ > 1 represents their average electoral influence (i.e. the
average number of counts at which their votes were counted) then the average
level of electoral influence under STV is k = αµ+ (1− α) and electoral welfare
under STV is W = N [αU(µ) + (1− α)U(1)].
Following Atkinson (1970), let k∗ ≤ k represent the average level of elec-
toral influence which, if equally distributed across the voters, would yield the
same level of electoral welfare as the existing distribution of electoral influence,
represented by the vector k = {ki}. In other words:
W = N × U(k∗) =
NX
i=1
U(ki) (12)
Then k∗ may be termed the equally distributed equivalent electoral influence.
Atkinson’s (1970) inequality index may be applied to the distribution, k = {ki},
of electoral influence across the voters by defining the inequality index:
I(k;N) = 1− (k∗/k) = 1−
"
N−1
NX
i=1
¡
ki/k
¢1−ε#1/(1−ε)
, ε > 0 ε 6= 1 (13)
The parameter ε - which ranges from 0 to ∞, so that the values of I(k;N)
range from 0 to 1 - is a measure of society’s aversion to inequality in electoral
influence. When ε = 0, society is indiﬀerent as to how a given average of
electoral influence (represented by k) is distributed across the voters: k∗ = k
and I(k;N) = 0. For ε > 0, k∗ < k and I(k;N) > 0. This means that society
would be prepared to adopt a voting method that embodies a lower average
electoral influence than the current method, provided that the reduction in the
average value is accompanied by an equal distribution of electoral influence
across the voters. The higher the value of the inequality aversion parameter, ε,
the smaller will be the value of k∗ and higher will be the value of I(k;N).
In order to make comparisons of loss (or gain) of welfare across diﬀerent
values of k, a specific transformation, linking the inequality measure I to the
diﬀerent values of k, is needed. One obvious transformation is the reverse of the
Atkinson transformation which yields the welfare function (Sen, 1973):
W = k(1− I) (14)
which is homogenous of degree one in the ki.
The electoral welfare function in equation (14) has a natural interpretation:
electoral welfare from a given average electoral influence, k, is reduced by the
extent of inequality in the distribution of electoral influence between voters .
Given a value of k, equation (14) says that electoral welfare depends upon the
degree of inequality in the distribution of electoral influence across voters - as
measured by the Atkinson index (I) - and this inequality, in turn, is determined
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by the inter-voter distribution of average electoral influence and upon the degree
to which society is averse to inequality in electoral influence.
One may compare electoral welfare under STV to that under a “naive”
method in which only first preference votes matter: for example, the six can-
didates in a constituency receiving the largest number of first preference votes
are elected as its representatives. Under STV, k = 1 + α(µ − 1) and electoral
welfare under STV and plurality - denoted, WS and WP , respectively - are,
from equation (14):
WS = [1 + α(µ− 1)][1− I(k;N)] and WP = 1 (15)
where, from equation (13):
I(k;N) = 1−
·
N
½
α
³µ
k
´ε
+ (1− α)
µ
1
k
¶ε¾¸1/(1+ε)
= 1−
·
N
½µ
1
k
¶ε
+ α
µ
µ− 1
k
¶ε¾¸1/(1+ε)
(16)
Then setting WS =WP (from equation (15)) yields:
[1 + α(µ− 1)][1− I(k;N)] = 1 (17)
and using the expression for I(k;N) from equation (16), allows one to solve
for the degree of inequality aversion (ε∗) which would make STV and plurality
to be welfare equivalent. In determining the outcome of an election, when
ε = ε∗, society is indiﬀerent between: an electoral method which allows voters
a fuller representation of their preferences than simply a single preference, but
takes unequal account of these representations; and a method which allows
voters a single representation of their preferences, but takes equal account of
this representation.
<Table 3>
Table 3 shows what the outcome of the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly
elections would have been if the “naive” method had been used to determine
the results. The number of seats to the DUP and the SDLP would have remained
unchanged at, respectively, 30 and 18. However, the UUP would have won four
fewer seats (down from 27 to 23), ‘Other’ Parties would have won two fewer
seats (down from 9 to 7) and Sinn Féin would have won six more seats (up from
24 to 30) to make it, along with the DUP, the largest party in the Assembly14.
4.1 Diagrammatic Representation
It may be useful to present an intuitive understanding of the approach towards
measuring inter-voter inequality in electoral influence, set out in the previous
14The degree of disproportionality, as measured by the least squares index would rise to
4.7. However, needless to say, this is not a fair reflection of the outcome under plurality since
party strategies in the selection of candidates were made on the basis of STV.
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sections, by means of a diagram. Figure 1 portrays a world of two voters, 1 and
2, who “share” a given average electoral influence, k to obtain, respectively, k1
and k2. The horizontal axis measures k1 and the vertical axis measures k2. The
sharing equation is k = (k1 + k2)/2 and this is represented by the “electoral-
possibility” line PQ in the diagram. Each point on PQ represents a (k1, k2)
combination that yields the value k. At any point on the 450 line OM, passing
through the origin, k1 = k2.
Superimposed upon the electoral-possibility line in the diagram are the elec-
toral welfare indiﬀerence curves: each curve shows the diﬀerent k1, k2 combi-
nations that yield the same level of electoral welfare, defined in equation (10).
If the voting system delivers the point X, then the average electoral influence
OC is distributed bewteen the two voters so that k1 = OC and k2 = OD. In
welfare terms this is equivalent to the outcome at point Y (since X and Y lie on
the same indiﬀerence curve) at which k1 = k2 = OB where OB is the “equally
distributed equivalent” electoral influence (k∗). The degree of inequality in the
voting method is, from equation (13), given by (1−OB/OA).
<Figure 1>
Under STV, k1 = µ and k2 = 1 at the point X in Figure 1. Under plurality,
k1 = k2 = 1 and this represented at the point Y in Figure 1. Since Y and X lie
on the same indiﬀerence curve, the degree of inequallity aversion - as represented
by how “bowed” the indiﬀerence curve is - is such as to make plurality and STV
welfare equivalent.
5 A Proposal for Reform of STV
As section 3 made clear, the unequal treatment of voters under STV arises
because, in eﬀecting the transfer of surplus votes of candidates elected at the
first count to the remaining candidates, all the votes received by the successful
candidates are inspected. However, in eﬀecting the transfer of surplus votes
of candidates elected at later counts, only the transfers received by such candi-
dates, at the count at which they were elected, are inspected. This inter-voter
inequality of treatment can be overcome by ensuring that, even for candidates
elected at later counts, the transfer of surplus votes is based on an inspection of
all the votes received by the successful candidates. Call this method Extended
STV (abbreviated to ESTV). Under ESTV, there would be no change in the
way that the surplus of candidates elected at the first count was eﬀected. Nor
would there be any change in the analysis relating to the elimination of candi-
dates. However, under ESTV, candidates elected at subsequent counts would
have their surplus votes transferred to the remaining candidates in the same
way that such transfers are eﬀected for candidates elected at the first count.
Under ESTV, the proportion of the total votes received by X at the Rth
count that would accrue to each of the remaining candidates is calculated for
each of the remaining candidates, denoted by j, as:
ρRXj = V RXj/V RX (18)
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where V RXj are the number of votes that j would receive from V
R
X , the total
votes received by X at the Rth count. The transfers received by j (from X, who
was elected at the Rth count15) would then be:
TRj = ρRXjSX (19)
and the total votes counted for j at the (R+ 1)th would be: V R+1j = V
R
j + T
R
j
In order to eﬀect ESTV, all the V RX ballots from which X received votes,
upto the Rth count, would have to be inspected: the V 1X ballots listing X as the
first-preference candidate would have to be inspected for the second-preference
candidate, and the T rX ballots that listed X as the r
th preference candidate
would have to be inspected for their (r + 1)th preference (r = 2..R).
In contrast to ESTV, STV, as discussed earlier, eﬀects the transfer of the
surplus of candidates, elected at counts later than the first, only in terms of the
transfers received at the count at which they were elected.
6 Conclusions
Issues relating to equality loom larger in the public concsiousness in Northern
Ireland - and play a more important role in the making of public policy - than
they do elsewhere in the UK. In large measure, this is due to the turbulent
history of Northern Ireland where, as is well known, tensions and animosities
between the Catholic and Protestant communities have, since the inception of
the state in 1920, run deep. Many events have coalesced to produce this state
of aﬀairs in Northern Ireland and some have acquired more prominence in the
popular consciousness than others. One event was the abolition in 1922 - by the
Government of Northern Ireland, under the Prime Ministership of Sir James
Craig - of proportional representation for local council elections (Bogdanor,
2001). This replacement, both at the level of district council and of parliamen-
tary elections, of proportional representation by plurality election established a
Protestant hegemony over aﬀairs in Northern Ireland16 and the exercise of this
hegemony in discriminating against Catholics in public sector employment and
housing culminated in the civil rights protests of the late 1960s and thus began
the spiral of violence that, notwithstanding the current cease-fire, continues to
splutter on.
However, it is the contention of this paper that by underpinning elections in
Northern Ireland - both to district councils and to the Northern Ireland Assem-
bly - by STV, a diﬀerent kind of inequality has been created. This inequality -
which remains largely unoted and, therefore, is not a cause for public comment
- is inequality between voters in the way their votes influence the electoral out-
come. Under STV, voters with diﬀerent preferences are treated diﬀerently in
terms of their impact on the electoral outcome. In essence, STV creates a two
15 It is assumed, without loss of generality, that no other candidate was elected at that count.
16 “A Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People” as one Unionist Prime Minister mem-
orably expressed it.
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classes of voters. In determining the list of successful candidates, some voters -
‘further-preference’ voters - have more than their first preference vote taken into
account, while for other voters - ‘first preference’ voters - it is only their first
preference that is counted. So, while all voters may express their preferences
over all the candidates, such expression is meanginful for only some voters and
meaningless for the remainder. If society was averse to inter-voter inequality
in electoral influence, it might prefer a voting system which, while allowing a
voters a more limited expression of preferences, allowed each voter’s preferences
to count equally towards the outcome of the election.
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Table 1
Percentage of Voters Whose Full Range of Preferences Influenced Electoral Outcomes
in Northern Ireland's 2004 Assembly Elections
Percentage of voters
giving 1st preference
to candidates
elected at first count
Percentage of voters
giving 1st preference
to candidates
elected at later
counts *
Percentage of voters
giving 1st preference
to candidates who
were eliminated
Percentage of voters
giving 1st preference
to candidates who
were neither
eliminated nor
elected
Belfast East 50.8
(UUP: 20.9; DUP:
29.9)
30.9 13.4 4.9
Belfast North 46.9
(DUP: 29.4; SF:
17.5)
33.8 15.0 4.3
Belfast South 17.2
(UUP: 17.2)
55.6 20.3 6.9
Belfast West 18.9
(SF: 18.9)
56.0 16 9.1
East Antrim 31.4
(UUP: 16.7; DUP:
14.7)
33.1 27.7 7.8
East Londonderry No election at first
count
63.7 29.3 7.0
Fermanagh South
Tyrone
No election at first
count
71.4 19.1 9.5
Foyle 46.5
(SDLP: 16.7; DUP:
15.0; SF: 14.8)
23.7 20.8 9.0
Lagan Valley 34.2
(UUP: 34.2)
41.2 16.6 8.0
Mid Ulster 36.8
(DUP: 18.5; SF
18.3)
44.3 10.2 8.7
Newry & Armagh 48.6
(DUP: 17.1; SF:
16.0; UUP: 15.5)
32.5 10.2 8.7
North Antrim 52.2
(DUP: 19.8; DUP:
17.9; UUP: 14.5)
30.5 10.2 7.1
North Down No election at first
count
64.4 27.3 8.3
South Antrim 18.9
(UUP: 18.9)
51.4 18.2 11.5
South Down 15.0
(DUP: 15.0)
53.3 23.0 8.7
Strangford 38.1
(DUP: 22.9; UUP:
15.2)
40.5 13.6 7.8
Upper Baan 21.1
(UUP: 21.1)
54.6 15.2 9.1
West Tyrone 29.2
(Ind: 14.8; SF: 14.4 )
44.5 15.6 10.7
Northern Ireland 28.4 45.8 17.5 8.3
DUP=Democratic Unionist Party UUP=Ulster Unioinist Party; SF=Sinn Féin; SDLP=Social Democratic Labour Party;
Ind=Independent
Table 2
'Further-Preference' Voters in Northern Ireland, by Party Support
Northern Ireland Assembly Elections, November 2003
Number of voters giving first preference to party elected at first countConstituency
DUP UUP SF SDLP Other
Parties
Belfast East 9254 6459 - - -
Belfast North 9276 - 5524 - -
Belfast South - 5389 - - -
Belfast West - - 6199 - -
East Antrim 4544 5175 - - -
East Londonderry - - - - -
Fermanagh South
Tyrone
- - - - -
Foyle 6101 - 6036 6806 -
Lagan Valley - 14,104 - - -
Mid Ulster 8211 - 8128 - -
Newry & Armagh 8125 7347 7595 - -
North Antrim 16630 6385 - - -
North Down - - - - -
South Antrim - 7066 - - -
South Down 6789 - - - -
Strangford 8548 5658 - - -
Upper Baan - 9158 - - -
West Tyrone - - 6019 - 6158
Total 'first count'
votes
77478 66741 39502 6806 6158
Total first preference
votes
177944 156931 162758 117547 76848
Share of further-
preference votes in
1st preference votes
44 43 24 6 8
Share of 1st
preference votes in
total votes cast
(692,028)
25.71 22.67 23.52 16.98 11.12
Number (and share)
of Assembly seats
30/108
(28)
27/108
(25)
24/108
(22)
18/108
(17)
9/108
(8)
Table 3
Party Positions Under STV and Plurality
Number of voters giving first preference to party elected at earliest countConstituency
DUP
STV          PL
UUP
STV          PL
SF
STV          PL
SDLP
STV          PL
Others
STV          PL
Belfast East 2                 1 2                 3 0                 0 0                 0 2                 2
Belfast North 2                 1 1                 1 2                 2 1                 2 0                 0
Belfast South 1                 2 2                 1 1                 1 2                 2 0                 0
Belfast West 1                 0 0                 0 4                 5 1                 1 0                 0
East Antrim 3                 3 2                 1 0                 0 0                 1 1                 1
East Londonderry 2                 3 2                 1 1                 1 1                 1 0                 0
Fermanagh and South
Tyrone
1                 1 2                 2 2                 2 1                 1 0                 0
Foyle 1                 1 0                 0 2                 3 3                 2 0                 0
Lagan Valley 1                 2 3                 1 0                 1 1                 1 1                 1
Mid Ulster 1                 1 1                 1 3                 3 1                 1 0                 0
Newry & Armagh 1                 1 1                 1 3                 3 1                 1 0                 0
North Antrim 3                 3 1                 1 1                 1 1                 1 0                 0
North Down 2                 2 2                 3 0                 0 0                 0 2                 1
South Antrim 2                 2 2                 2 0                 1 1                 0 1                 1
South Down 1                 1 1                 1 2                 2 2                 2 0                 0
Strangford 3                 3 2                 2 0                 0 0                 1 1                 0
Upper Baan 2                 2 2                 1 1                 2 1                 1 0                 0
West Tyrone 1                 1 1                 1 2                 3 1                 0 0                 1
Total Seats 30             30 27             23 24             30 18             18 9                7
Figure 1
Inequality in the Distribution of Electoral Influence
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